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Competition theory suggests that an increase in collective threat to the dominant ethnic 
and racial groups increases out-group prejudice, which should translate into support for 
extreme right-wing parties (ERP) in national elections. Collective threat is understood 
as competition over scarce resources, which is intensified through rising immigration, 
unemployment, inflation rates and reduced economic growth. This study uses regional 
level data in five Western European countries over the period of 2000-2011 to measure 
the effects of the proposed variables on extreme right-wing party support in national 
elections. The results indicate that high levels of immigration and reduced economic 
growth increases ERP support as the theory predicted. Contrary to the theory, however, 
unemployment and inflation correlate negatively with ERP support. Though the basic 
tenants of competition theory found clear support indicating structural change that will 
spur extreme right-wing vote, it is necessary to reevaluate competition theory in relation 
to unemployment and possibly also to inflation, in order to determine whether the 
unpredicted results come from differences in prejudice levels or other competing values 
that are capable of undermining the role of prejudice.  
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Extreme Right Parties (ERPs) have seen an unparalleled success story during the past 
three decades. In the beginning of the 80s, parties classified as extreme right gained 
around 1 per cent of the vote on average in elections in Europe. By the year 2011, there 
were 11 countries in the European Union that had one successful extreme-right party in 
national parliaments with at least 5 percent of the total vote and one country, Austria, 
with two successful ERPs. The most recent vote share on the average for these 13 ERPs 
was 9.8 percent whereas the average highest vote was 12.7 percent. For 7 of these 
ERPs, the most recent result was also the highest. There still remained 15 EU member 
states where ERPs have scored less than 5 percent of the vote or they do not contest 
elections at all (Mudde, 2011: 13). ERPs have considerably increased their vote share 
and have made a successful break into the electoral market. They moved past the image 
of a negligible fringe parties to a new salient force. The comparison between the highest 
and most recent vote also shows that the rise of the ERPs is still ongoing.  
 
A change of this magnitude indicates that voting for ERPs has become more than a 
manner of expressing protest votes, nor can we classify ERPs as single issue parties that 
are expected to disappear once a mainstream party incorporates the elements they have 
been advocating for. The change has been both on the supply and demand side of the 
process. The parties which classify as ERPs as a rule gave up their most extreme views 
such as biological racism during the 1980s and 1990s and adopted a milder populist 
version of their previous self. On the supply side, the percentage of voters who are now 
willing to consider an ERP as a legitimate choice in elections has also grown 
substantially. Both these changes speak of a larger structural trend that requires an 
explanation going beyond the specific elections and specific parties, and looks at wider 
trends taking place in the society. 
 
Studying ERP election success does not only reveal that changes have taken place in 
voters‟ attitudes during the past three decades, but they have many far reaching 
influences that go beyond these specific parties and their supporters.  They tend to add 
fragmentation to the party system in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the number of 
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parties and secondly, by increasing the share of seats in the parliaments that as a rule are 
excluded from the bargaining process. The anti-system tendencies more often than not 
pose an obstacle for the ERP to cooperate with dominant parties, and in this, limits the 
options of bargaining within the parliament. It has also been noted that the mainstream 
parties move closer to the ERP positions if ERPs gain success in elections, which again 
influences the entire party system and further legitimizes ERP platforms. (Jackman & 
Volpert, 1996: 504) These trends make ERPs relevant beyond their electorate and they 
are central for the wellbeing of democratic systems and political stability.  
 
This research firstly explains the changes that have taken place on the supply side of the 
process, provides a brief overview of ERP history, classification and changes in their 
election platforms. On the demand side it analyses competition theory, the structural 
changes that have increased demand for democratic representation by these parties. 
Competition theory aims to explain the rise in ERP support through increased 
competition for scarce resources that reinforces prejudice against out-groups. It predicts 
that when competition increases either due to changes in relative size of the groups or 
through economic changes, prejudice should also increase. 
 
From this theoretical approach two hypotheses are formed. The first predicts a positive 
correlation between higher percentages of immigrants in the population and higher 
support for ERPs. The second predicts a correlation between macroeconomic indicators, 
in particular GDP growth rate, unemployment and inflation and ERP success in 
elections.  
 
The data is gathered from five countries that have had an ERP take part in national 
parliamentary elections during the past decade. This data has been compiled on a 
regional basis to match the regional data for immigration and unemployment. The 
comparability of the data, particularly on immigration, sets limitations to how many 
countries could be included and eventually five countries were chosen: the Netherlands, 
Italy, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. The data is composed for national parliamentary 
elections that took place between years 2000 and 2011 where at least one ERP party ran 
in the elections.  The data for immigration was gathered from national statistics 
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databases and checked for comparability in terms of how immigration was measured. 
Unemployment data is also regional, whereas economic growth and inflation are 
national level indicators for the election year.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is to gather a large enough sample for the last decade in 









Extreme-right parties are a growing phenomenon in Europe. They are described as anti-
system parties, and as such, they question fundamental values of liberal democracies. 
The study specifically will look at five European countries that have stood out with 
noticeable extreme right-wing party success during elections - Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy. These were the countries studied when theories used 
in the following proposal were developed and in terms of which considerable 
disagreements have been revealed. The nature of the disagreements will be explained in 
the following chapters. The thesis will look at the period from 2000 until 2011 and the 
national elections that have been conducted during this period.  
 
This chapter looks into ERP history and how trends in election success during different 
post war decades in Europe are closely connected to the ideological changes the parties 
experienced during this period. The ideological premises of the parties form a closely 
connected unit between nativism and authoritarianism that reinforce each other. These 
two phenomenon are utilized through the method of populist antagonism between in-
groups and out-groups to form a competitive frame in which the dominant nation in the 
country is juxtaposed to the immigrant population. This ideological composition allows 






ERPs were relevant in Europe between the two World Wars but they became practically 
absent from parliaments from 1950s to 1970s. The fascist heritage of the parties made 
them highly controversial and the problems and topics they represented had been tainted 
by the interwar period (Minkernberg, 2011: 41). The outcome of the war and genocide 
that took place during it left the ERPs without a legitimate master frame. Biologically 
based racism, anti-Semitism and antidemocratic sentiments were all shunned by the 
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majority of the population. Apart from few exceptional ERPs like the MSI in Italy 
during early 1970s and NDP in Germany during late 1960s there were few parties that 
gained support in national elections. The low success is believed to have been supported 
by quick economic growth and fairly high levels of political trust. (Rydgren, 2005: 413 
- 414)  
 
A change occurred during 80s, when several new ERPs emerged but also old parties in 
a few cases gained more success. Currently there are some extreme-right wing parties 
with clear roots in interwar fascist parties, and there are “new” extreme-right parties 
(also referred to as populist parties) that deny any fascist heritage (Knigge, 1998: 251). 
This has created a dilemma where there is research that insists on differentiating 
between neo-fascist parties and new populist parties and there are those that would treat 
them as a single party family.  
 
Until 1985 the average performance of neo-fascist parties and populist parties in 
Western European elections was mostly equal to around 1% of the total vote, with 
upsurges and lower points for both groups. Since 1985, populist parties have been 
clearly surging ahead, by 1990 they averaged around 2.5% of the vote and by 2000 it 
was 4,5%. During the same period neo fascist parties have been on a steady decline, 
falling to just 0.3% of the vote by 2000. (Golder, 2003: 444)  
 
ERPs, both neo fascist and populist, share many commonalities. They are all anti-
system parties. They share an authoritarian agenda and prefer anti pluralist procedures. 
Moreover, they support strictly exclusionary, particularistic conceptualizations of 
citizenship. In elections, anti-immigration rhetoric has taken priority for all these parties 
and, thus, it has been increasingly more difficult to make meaningful distinctions 
between the two party groups. (Knigge, 1998: 251) 
 
For example, in 1986 two Swedish parties, the Swedish Progress Party and the BBS 
(Keep Sweden Swedish) emerged and formed Sweden Party which was two years later 
named the Swedish Democrats. They have roots in Swedish fascism and during the 80s 
and also early 90s they supported neo fascist statements and were openly anti-
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democratic. Since the second half of the 90s they have tried to distance themselves from 
the fascist heritage and, as a result, have gradually increased their support. The process 
culminated in 2006 with their successful national elections (2.9 per cent of the vote) and 
290 mandates in municipal councils. They managed an even stronger presence in 2010 
elections where they received 5.7 per cent of the vote. (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011: 4) 
Despite the predecessors of the party, it is now classified as a populist party based on its 
election platforms. (Golder, 2003: 448) This firstly serves to show that there is mobility 
between the two party groups, which undermines the importance of the classification of 
two distinct ERP groups but more importantly, there is a trend among ERPs to soften 
the extreme standpoint in order to gain votes closer to the center. This research does not 
need to distinguish between the two party groups since all the ERPs in question are 
considered to be populist rather than neo fascist and they all share fairly similar issue 
positions for questions most relevant for the competition theory. 
 
Despite the fact that there is no need to divide ERPs into distinct groups, it is still 
complicated to place ERPs into one party group as every individual party still differs 
from the mean considerably. They lack the homogeneity that has been used to describe 
the “Greens,” the “Socialists” or the “Communists”. There is no uniform organizational 
structure to these parties, leadership style differs and electorate profile varies between 
parties, so finding a range of shared properties is difficult beyond general attitudes. 
(Ignazi, 2002: 22 - 23) 
 
There are international party organizations that also help to identify party groups. For 
example the Socialist international involves most social democrats, socialists and labor 
parties, even the group is broad and has several differences in the policies they support. 
Extreme-right parties within the EU parliament tend to belong to Group of Independents 
for a Europe of the Nations, but not all parties considered to be ERPs belong there. 
(Norris, 2005: 43 – 44) 
  
Since the trend of ERPs is fairly new compared to labor or conservative parties, we‟ve 
seen a lot of new parties emerging, merging with existing parties and disappearing over 
a short period of time, which makes the classification more complicated. For example 
 11 
the Italian Moviementa Sociale Italiano, which had previously been classified as an 
ERP changed its name into Alleanza Nazionale and shifted towards the center with a 
new platform presented at the 1995 congress and is now classified as a proto-
conservative party rather than as an ERP (Ignazi, 2005: 337). Consequently, one must 
be careful in research when including it into the data pool. The opposite occurred with 
the Lega Nord, which started at the 80s as a combination of smaller regional parties but 
made a unified breakthrough in national elections 1992. Though many ERPs become 
more moderate after national election success, the Lega Nord adopted more of typical 
ERP characteristics and is now described as more radical than in the previous period 
and is definitely considered to be an ERP. (Ignazi, 2005: 345)  
 
 
Placement on the left-right scale 
 
Apart from questions regarding organization, party history and international 
organizations, a fairly common way of classifying ERPs has been through placement on 
a left-right scale. Most studies that analyze party platforms have placed ERPs very 
strongly to the right. On the scale where zero is strongest statement supporting left and 
ten is the same for right, most of the popular ERPs receive a score of 8,5 or more. The 
parties included in the study were The Danish Peoples Party, The Danish Progress 
Party, The French National Front, The Valloon National Front, The Flemish Blokk, The 
German Republicans, The Dutch Center Democrats, The Northern League and Austrian 
Freedom Party. It is also relevant to note, that there was a gap between 8 and 8,5 where 
no parties landed in the countries that were studied, which means that there is a fairly 
clear point of differentiation between main stream right and ERPs when considering this 
type of party classification. (Spanje & Van der Brug, 2007: 1025) 
 
This would create the impression that the extreme right is clearly and univocally 
representing the right-wing sentiment, however, this is not entirely correct. The ERPs‟ 
historical roots lie in fascism and some historical fringes as well as current neo-fascists 
claim they are more affiliated with the left, rather than the right. They tend to be anti-
capitalist, supportive of social welfare to an extent, revolutionary in their attempt to 
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change the existing system and many fascist thinkers have rejected association with 
right-wing politics primarily because right identifies with conservatism. Studies in 
Italian fascism history have distinguished between social movements that were anti-
bourgeois, anti-capitalist, revolutionary and secular and between the fascist regime 
which was pro-capital, clerical and conservative. Though the regime influence has been 
stronger, social movements have still left a mark on existing ERPs. (Ignazi, 2003: 15) 
 
Many ERPs support more left-leaning job security and unemployment benefits 
alongside with strongly right-wing tax systems and liberal economic policies. There are 
also some ERPs that incorporate less standard left-wing policies. The Dutch List Pim 
Fortuyn is an example of an unusual ERP that supports gay marriage. (Spanje, 2011: 
297) Overall it is justified to call these extreme-right parties if one looks at the entire 
party platform, but it is possible to detect clear left-wing leaning policy positions in 








Ideology of the extreme-right can be described through pillars of nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism according to Mudde (2007). These pillars are utilized in 
practice through an antagonism between in-groups and out-groups based on ethno-
pluralist world view and competition over scarce resources.  
 
 
Defining the extreme-right  
 
The term extreme-right has been developed in German tradition of study.  The word 
extremismus refers to anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-constitutional principles. It‟s 
particularly the anti-system connotation that makes the term more precise and thus a 
better term then populist party or neo-fascism. Extreme-right represents the ideological 
stance on the one hand and position of the left-right scale on the other. The ideological 
stance helps to characterize the party family and position on the left-right scale – though 
less relevant, is helpful when separating the extreme-right from other mainstream 
parties on the right. (Ignazi, 2002: 23) 
 
ERPs have also been referred to as New Right by Rydgren. The term was mostly used 
to describe the counter action to left dominance in France best known as Nouvelle 
Droite. Their most notable innovation was replacing biologically based racism with 
ethno-pluralism, which has also been called new racism. (2005: 426). Iganzi considers 
the term still misleading, especially when translated to English, as the expression is 
simultaneously used to describe the new-conservative agenda. Calling ERPs populist 
parties is very common and it has established itself as a specific term that has a large 
role to play in today‟s literature. What it usually signifies is a rejection of current 
functioning of the political system and a certain kind of rhetoric which relies on 
“common sense”. (Ignazi, 2002: 23) 
 
This research follows the extreme-right definition rather than any of the alternatives and 
this mostly due to the precision of the term. Populism is something that can be used to 
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describe many different elements of the democratic process and it is not in its essence 
limited to the extreme-right, even if ERPs have used populism in a specific and 
systematic way that does differ from most mainstream parties. New right, though more 
specific, is more suitable in French where it stands for a specific movement at a certain 
time and place, but is harder to generalize to a whole party group, as several party 
groups can be called with the same term.  
 
 
Basic elements of the ideology 
 
Mudde has argued that ERP platform rests of three main pillars. The first pillar is 
nativism, which represents congruence between the state and the native population. The 
second pillar is authoritarianism, and the third pillar is populism (by populism Mudde 
mostly means antagonism based on “us” vs “them” division). These characteristics 
occur in all of the existing ERPs and have come to represent what extreme-right stands 
for. He purposefully does not include economic aspects but stresses that economic 
issues only matter as far as they have been connected to one of the three pillars through 
successful framing of the issue. (Mudde, 2007: 3) 
 
One of the ideological underpinnings of extreme-right is formed by 
counterrevolutionary thinking which is critical of modernity, yet its role is fairly 
minimal when compared to fascism and racists component. Fascism however has had 
very many different interpretations and forms of representation, but one could argue that 
the ideological core, which all fascists representations had in common, is populist ultra-
nationalism. It idealizes mobilized partisan masses which work for a common purpose 
of the nation. (Ignazi, 2002: 24) The connection between the pillar of nativism and 
authoritarianism is thus strongly connected and they reinforce each other as in fascism. 
The pillar of nativism rests on the concept that a group takes priority in comparison to 
the individual and thus it has an authoritarian connection. At the same time authoritarian 
dominance over the individual would remain unjustified as long as there is no 
understanding of greater good, in this case the nation. Therefore one could argue that 
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the two pillars of nativism and authoritarianism are highly dependent on each other as 
they conceptually make whole in which neither side would be justified individually.  
 
It is also necessary to note that the nation is not the only concept that fits into this 
understanding.  ERPs perceive the society as a whole to be formed of basic structures 
such as family, religion, community, homeland, duty and occupation. All of these form 
hierarchical structures where the individual is subordinate to the group and a similar 
pattern applies to the relationship between the common good and authoritarianism as it 
does with the nation. (Swyngedouw & Ivaldi, 2001: 9) 
 
The third pillar of populism functions as a tool in distinguishing the unit that individual 
is subordinated to from the external and this makes the differentiation between in-
groups and out-groups essential for the parties. There are very broad in-groups and out-
groups based on culture, race and religion but also smaller divisions among the same 
racial, cultural and religious groups based on ideology, nationalism and political values.  
 
There are country and party specific traits that should be considered before 
generalizations. One of the reasons why the Lega Nord in Italy was not immediately 
included among ERPs is that they started off as a regional party that demanded 
autonomy for the north. The grievances were related to the poorer southern regions that 
the north was donating to. Many of the us versus them methods were used to distinguish 
the urban, successful and hardworking north from the backward and lazy south. It took 
a while before the party started stressing the immigration issue and framing immigrants 
as the out-group. Also in Belgium, the out-groups are not only immigrated ethnic 
minorities but the party opposes itself to the Franchophone Wallonia to an equal degree. 
(Schain et al, 2002: 8) 
 
The main tools of this populist strategy and aims are still very similar to the more 
standard nativist discourse that signifies the nation as the in-group rather than a region. 
The importance of the in-group is stressed through opposing an out-group and assigning 
blame to it for the grievances the in-group suffers.  
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The in-group can also have an even narrower definition. Most ERPs oppose themselves 
to the mainstream parties and try to separate themselves from the dominant political 
elite. This can be done through addressing corruption claims raised against mainstream 
parties like in Italy during mid-nineties. But it can also be done through a more general 
discourse. A fairly common division can be made between the ethnically committed and 
the ethnically neutral. The ethnically committed value ideals of nationalism, they have 
higher moral standards because they lift the community above the individual egoism 
and are capable of self-sacrifice. The ethnically neutral (often the established political 
elite but it can be a larger group) are anti-national or cosmopolitan, selfish and blind to 
the threat that the nation is under. (Swyngedouw & Ivaldi, 2001: 5) The nativist pillar 
has a wide interpretation and many different types of out-groups can be fit into this 
frame and they can take different priorities. It works through an understanding that 
society is composed of unequal groups as well as individuals and they can form 
hierarchies.  Depending on the group that is defined as the in-group the out-group is 
formed and it is fairly flexible as long as it fits the discourse the party promotes.  
 
Rydgren (2008) argues that when we look at this value system in practice, it is used to 
frame the dominant out-group, the immigrants, in four different ways.  
1. Threat to ethno-national identity 
2. Major cause of criminality 
3. Cause of unemployment 
4. Abusers of the welfare state  
The first two can be considered to be part of the ethno-pluralist discourse, which 
opposes different ethnicities mixing. The third and fourth are part of the welfare 
chauvinism frame where immigrants and natives are depicted as competing over scarce 
resources. Actual policy proposals have included giving natives priority in housing, jobs 
and healthcare, which takes the form of reversed affirmative action. (Rydgren, 2008: 
746) 
 
Firstly, these frames are very closely connected to Mudde‟s pillars of nativism and 
authoritarianism. The threat to ethno-national identity falls well into the category of 
nativism as it creates the in-group that ought to be kept distinct and separate from out-
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groups in order to preserve the community. Ethnicity based criminal behavior places 
blame on the out-group and expresses support for authoritarian measurers to restore the 
wellbeing of the society.  The two both use us vs them antagonism in relation to 
immigrants which is connected to the populism pillar. Unemployment and abuse of the 
welfare state are a direct representation of the competition over scarce resources and fall 
well under the description of the competition theory that aims to explain ERP success.  
 
In terms of the economic policy ERPs as a rule prefer to avoid opposing workers and 
employers but they tend to promote a national solidarity and it is usually the immigrants 
that form the out-group in a market context. The capital versus labor division is replaced 
by multicultural versus national axis. They promote a combination of free market 
policies and welfare distribution services, which enables them to get support from 
different income groups, but they are unwilling to extend social welfare to immigrants. 
In accordance with nativism, they tend to support protectionism in international trade, 
often oppose WTO and stress the importance of sustaining local jobs and supporting 
local products and entrepreneurs. (Swyngedouw & Ivaldi, 2001: 9) In that regard, one 
can also agree with Mudde when he stated that economic matters are framed through the 
nativism discourse only through this frame do they become significant.  
 
On the other hand, one can also say that ERPs oppose promoting competition within the 
main ethnic group and avoid all common opposing interest frames between workers and 
employers. Especially the ladder makes ERPs stand out compared to mainstream parties 
as references to competition between income groups and occupation representatives is 
fairly common otherwise. Yet the strategic choice seems justified as placing standard 
in-group competition models with ethnicity based models supports the relevance of 
immigration as a topic and increases the salience of in- and out-group competition 







ERPs as an anomaly 
 
ERPs are often viewed as a pathological formation of values that opposes the general 
principles that guide western liberal democracies. They are either the votes of the 
victims of the modernization process on the lower end of socioeconomic division or 
they are protest votes to oppose mainstream politics in general or parties in particular. 
Mudde argues that this view is out dated and if one looks at the three main pillars of the 
ERPs, they advocate many of the existing values held by western countries, but they 
have merely framed them in a more radical manner. Nativism proposes that all states 
should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that 
nonnative elements (both people and ideas/values) are a threat to the homogeneous 
nation-state. This ideology dates far back in European history and though there are 
disagreements on how far a state can go pursuing homogeneity among its population, 
the idea itself is not foreign to mainstream thinking. It is recognized in several 
constitutions of EU member countries and even the UN charter begins by calling for 
respect for the “self-determination of peoples”. The constitutions also support openness 
to foreigners and not all states are nativist, but there are “ideological habits” that 
reinforce nativist principles, such as history education, media outlets, brands that 
recommend consuming local goods, etc. (Mudde, 2007: 5-6) Claiming that nativism is 
foreign to the western way of thinking is incorrect. Furthermore, many of the nativist 
habits stress the element of competition. The promotion of local products emphasizes 
the element of market competition, the media covers sports competitions and 
introducing national and cultural elements in education helps to increase the in-group 
feeling, which can later be used for opposition to out groups with the correct master 
frame. 
 
Authoritarianism, or belief in an orderly and law abiding society where breaking the law 
is punished severely, is common not only to extreme-right parties but most of the right 
in general. Authoritarianism has been represented by non-religious liberal thinking to 
orthodox Christianity and in most fields in between. The previous two pillars are 
reinforced by populism. (Mudde, 2007: 6) The fact that their platforms are built on 
commonly held but underrepresented viewpoints has granted the ERPs an opportunity 
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for electoral success, given that they manage to represent the issues in a manner that is 
acceptable to the average voter. 
 
ERPs have positioned themselves further away from extremists and closer to where they 
could compete with mainstream parties while utilizing the already preexisting values in 
their ideology. This explains why ERPs have increased their ability to compete with 
main stream right parties in elections, especially after moving further away from the 
traditional fascist past and taking on a more liberal and populist approach. 
 
The more lenient and ethno-pluralist frame that was adopted in 1980s and onwards has 
made it possible for the ERPs to increase their support also among voters that as a rule 
support democratic principles and do not share hostility towards immigrants. If in 2011 
the average support rate for an ERP is almost 10 percent of the vote in 12 European 
countries, we run into trouble referring to ERPs as an anomaly or an exception.  
 
ERPs react to the existing demand among the population regarding issues of 
immigration, safety and political trust. The frames ERPs use are salient and can 
influence also other parties through competition, framing and the general shift in the 
discourse. The antagonism between in-groups and out-groups is likely to remain a 
relevant part of the political bargaining as long as ERPs continue to enjoy success in 
national elections.  
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1.2. Theoretical framework 
 
Numerous theories have attempted to explain the rise of ERP success in elections. 
Arzheimer (2009) placed them four broader groups with generally similar approach to 
the matter. The first group focuses on extreme-right party votes, voters‟ socio-economic 
indicators and their belief systems and potential motivation for their vote, which was 
started by Adorno in the 50s but has been thoroughly developed since. The second field 
starts with the assumption that ERP success can primarily be explained with social 
disintegration in which previous social norms have ceased to exist and social change has 
brought about the feelings of anxiety and isolation. Social disintegration inspires the 
need for strong leadership and conservative ideology which ERPs offer. The third major 
strand of theory looks at group conflict. There is heterogeneity among this research as it 
can vary from traditional scapegoating theories, where minorities provide an easy target 
for preexisting aggression and frustration in the society and in that sense is closer to 
social disintegration field. On the other end of the spectrum it can also look at material 
and rational causes of out-group resentment that has been brought on by competition 
over scarce resources between majority and minority groups. The middle area between 
the two extremes is explained through “status politics”, modern racism and social 
identity which can be summarized with the term relative deprivation – one social group 
perceives that in relation to the other group they do not get what they are entitled to 
despite the fact, that in absolute terms, they may be getting more. The forth field differs 
from previous fields as it spends more energy on contextual factors and focuses on a 
central notion of opportunity structures. The purpose is to look at the institutions, party 
system, general values and sentiment in the society in order to explain the emergence of 
ERPs. (Arzheimer, 2009: 260 - 261)  
 
The line of research that focuses on individual characteristics of the voters has found 
some support, however, this strand of research has two shortcomings. Firstly, the ERP 
voter profile has become more diverse as the popularity of the parties has grown. 
Secondly, it does not consider wider structural changes and it is less suitable for 
explaining the emergence of ERPs and larger fluctuations in their success and failure.  
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The opportunity structure theory does look at structural changes. It also considers the 
specific characteristics of the country‟s party system in order to determine the 
opportunities for new parties as well as their spatial location. However, it is harder to 
find support for this in empirical studies. For example Kitschelt proposed that spatial 
location of mainstream parties on the left-right scale can either hinder or support ERP 
success (Kitschelt, 1999: 453). His hypothesis was that if the mainstream parties, 
particularly on the right, move closer to the center, it creates an opportunity for ERPs to 
emerge. This would mean that in the 1980s and 1990s when most ERP started to gain 
support, there was a vacuum on the right end of the scale. Studies measuring the party 
placement on the left-right scale discovered the opposite case instead. Before ERPs 
emerged, there was a trend from main stream conservative parties to become more 
right-wing, which should have hindered ERP success. (Ignazi, 2002: 30) 
 
The social disintegration theory can explain well the mental states that creates a longing 
for a strong leader and support for authoritarianism, but it is less suited for explaining 
why it is often the immigrants and other out-groups that become the central element of 
campaign. Immigration tends to be a more salient issue than the shortcomings of the 
democratic system even if anti-system tendencies are part of most ERP platforms. 
 
This research chose the competition theory, firstly because there are shortcoming in 
alternative approaches and secondly, because many of the elements discussed in the 
ideology section indicate that the elements of a perceived competition are present in 
most ERP‟s ideological programs. Both the pillars of nativism as well as 
authoritarianism require in their essence the concept of in-groups and our-groups to 
exist. In order to have an identity that becomes the central element of uniting the 
electorate and which also functions as a justification for authoritarian elements, there 
needs to be a concept of the nation, or the ethnic group or a smaller division that 
becomes the center of the idea. 
 
The populism pillar means ERPs prefer to form their ideologies based on opposing 
interests of the in-group and out-groups. They do it by depicting the in-group as it were 
in a disadvantaged position, either due to the competition on the job market, increasing 
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criminal behavior or changing cultural environment. These grievances are then 
connected to the out-group that is predominantly immigrants, though it can also be 
related to regional opposition as in Italy or Belgium as previously mentioned. This 
overlap between the party ideology and competition theory gives a good starting point 
for the research. 
 
Competition theory suggests that whenever groups compete for scarce resources, such 
as jobs, welfare benefits etc., it increases the average level of prejudice and intensifies 
the relationship between individual characteristics and prejudice. (Knovich, 2004: 20) 
When this theory usually looks at the rise and decline of prejudice in general, then the 
aim of this research is to see which particular factors correlate with changes in 
prejudice.  
 
The theory considers the use of in-groups and out-groups in party rhetoric but also in 
media at large as a key element. The discourse connects out-groups and grievances the 
in-groups experience such as unemployment, rise in criminal activity or change in the 
social structure of the society in general. 
 
Group-threat theory predicts rise in prejudice when collective threat perception rises. 
Mechanisms can include increases in the relative size of the competing groups, poor 
economic conditions, etc. The balance and relevance of the correlates depends on how 
these changes are utilized in frames that oppose out-groups and how well these frames 
resonate among the general population. The part of the population that is expected to be 
most influenced by the frames, are subgroups most likely to be in direct competition 
with the out-groups. However, as group theory does include the role of framing, it is 
also possible that if scarcity of recourses are triggered by an economic downturn or an 
active policy change by the government, then the out-groups do not necessarily have to 
be seen as the group to blame. A possible outcome in the limits of this theory is 
decrease in prejudice towards out groups if the responsibility is assigned to the 
government or the elite in general.  (Knovich, 2004: 21) 
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ERPs and their success in elections enables to measure existing levels of prejudice. 
Studies that analyze what motivates ERP vote have reached various conclusions 
depending on the method and selected data. As a general trend it has been detected, 
however, that anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction tend to correlate best 





2. Extreme-right voting 
 
 
This chapter looks at previous studies that have been conducted in the field of extreme-
right voting in order to test the main hypothesis. It continues to explain in detail the 
research relevant for competition theory, mainly studies comparing ERP vote with 
immigration rates and economic indicators.  
 
The sudden growth in ERP success is a major phenomenon that cannot be explained 
only through successful framing and the correct choice of issues raised during elections. 
ERPs have been steadily gaining votes in almost all western countries where they have 
been present for a while and also new ERPs in countries with no previous success 
stories for extreme-right are starting to emerge and grow. This implies that we are not 
only looking at a few smaller trends but there might be a case to argue for a structural 
change that has been taking place since the 80s which supports the demand side of this 
process.  
 
Betz proposes that this process can be explained by a structural change that took place 
around the 1970s. During the first postwar decades western societies experienced a 
dynamic economic growth and unforeseen levels of economic prosperity. Since the 
middle of the seventies this trend reversed and a decline in productivity occurred. For 
the first time since the Second World War real income either started to fall or stagnated 
and the gap between the higher and lower socioeconomic classes widened. Postwar 
years had almost achieved full employment that in the 1970s was replaced by mass 
unemployment. The reason for the shift in employment levels was a shift from labor-
intensive production to capital-intensive production. The unskilled or semi-skilled labor 
that formed the core of the postwar production was becoming increasingly devalued, 
which created a group that has become known as “the losers of modernization”. (Betz, 
1998:7) 
 
First studies that were conducted based on this hypothesis showed that extreme-right 
parties‟ electorate is predominantly male, from working and lower-middle classes and 
with lower education than the average voter. (Arzheimer, 2009: 259). The theory has 
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later been proven to be less supported by data than first expected, as extreme-right 
voters are now found among all income groups and division based on education is also 
weaker. But the general trend that right-wing voters tend to be less educated, younger 
and financially less well-off then the average voter is still confirmed. (Lubbers et al, 
2002: 347-348).  
 
The majority of studies, which look at the profile of the ERP voters have still concluded 
that on average they fit the profile Betz described. Lower-end socioeconomic 
background and direct competition with immigrant groups increases the likelihood of 
voting for an ERP. Rational calculations of the individual seem to provide an 
explanation with remarkable consistency. (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 317) 
 
It has also been indicated that extreme-right parties gain votes under similar political 
and pragmatic considerations as moderate parties. The vote cannot be considered as 
merely a protest vote or a judgment on the government, but it is usually driven by 
sharing the political values of the party and also taking into account the party-specific 
indicators such as size, probability to make it into the parliament, etc. (Van Der Brug et 
al, 2000: 77) This indicates that analyzing extreme-right success should follow the usual 
methods and presumptions applied to all voting behavior studies. 
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2.1.  ERPs and immigration 
 
 
Immigration skepticism (measured as willingness to reduce immigration) has been 
proven to be a good indicator of the right-wing vote. However, it is important to 
distinguish immigration skepticism in particular and xenophobic attitudes in general. 
Xenophobic attitudes measured by a variety of questions have a considerably weaker 
correlation with extreme-right vote in comparison to immigration skepticism even if this 
goes against most expectations as well as previous theories on extreme-right voter 
profile. (Rydgren, 2008: 737)  
 
Several theories also assume a positive correlation between immigration skepticism and 
proportion of immigrants among the population, but this has received contradictory 
empirical results, depending on the method and region. Rydgren (2008) used data from 
six western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands 
and Norway) to test the theory which claims that higher rates of ethnic heterogeneity in 
the region leads to higher rates of extreme-right vote, however the correlations were 
proven to be much weaker than expected and showed limited ability to support the 
theory. (Rydgren, 2008: 737).  
 
Yet, studies conducted over a longer period of time in much the same countries, do 
show that an increase in immigration rates strongly correlates with rising support for 
right-wing parties (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al, 2002). The problem, however, arises 
from the fact that contradicting research was firstly conducted by using a different 
method: snapshot versus longitudinal studies and with a considerable difference in the 
time period. The longitudinal studies were conducted earlier and suggested that by 2008 
ethnic heterogeneity should be able to explain right-wing support better, however, this 
was not the case. Looking at the longer period should help provide an answer to the 
question. 
 
This study aims to test the theory that predicts an increase in right-wing party support as 
immigrant population increases over the period between years 2000 - 2011 and compare 
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it with national statistics on immigrant population and the increase it has been through 
over that period. Recent national level comparative studies on this topic that cover a 
longer period are missing at the moment. This particular period is not chosen only 
because of limited studies during this period, but also because it has shown an 




2.2. Economic indicators: economic growth, unemployment, inflation 
 
Socioeconomic indicators have been considered relevant to ERP success. Taking the 
theory of economic disadvantage as a positive force on extreme-right success from the 
individual level to the macro level makes things more complicated. 
 
The theory on economic competition mentioned earlier  aims to explain extreme-right 
voting. Competition for jobs increases between the ethnically dominant population and 
recent immigrants due to economic decline, and this creates political support for 
restrictions on immigration (Lubbers et al, 2002: 349). Swank and Bets (2003) studied 
the influence of economic factors on the right-wing vote in 16 European countries 
between 1981 and 1998 and discovered that a universal welfare state considerably 
depresses the rightwing vote, which also creates a strong link between economic 
insecurity and extreme-right support. (Swank & Betz, 2003: 215) This shows that if 
direct competition over resources is intermediated by the state through means of 




Competition theory assumes that there‟s  competition over scarce resources. The 
competition should become more acute when economic growth slows down due to two 
reasons. Firstly, slower economic growth creates less jobs, which generates more 
competition for every single job. Secondly, slower economic growth or decline should 
mean smaller budget for the welfare state and hence the intermediation effects become 
smaller. Thus, welfare chauvinist frames become more salient in economic downturn 
circumstances. The frames draw links between limited resources for the sick and elderly 
while stressing how much of the state budget is spent on the immigrant population in 
one way or another. During slower economic growth periods or economic recession, the 
socioeconomically marginalized groups tend to grow, which furthers the breeding 








ERP election campaigns have often linked unemployment and immigration. The 
National Front in France used the following slogan during the 1984 EU elections: “Two 
million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work”. The 
Republicans in Germany proposed to solve unemployment by stopping immigration and 
Freedom Party in Austria proposed to give citizens legalized privileges in the job 
market over immigrants. (Golder, 2003: 438) 
 
There is very little empirical evidence to suggest that immigration could have a negative 
effect on wider economic indicators or unemployment in particular. Also, among the 
population that is most likely to compete for the same jobs as immigrants do, 
unemployment rates rarely correlate with number of immigrants in the region (Golder, 
2003: 438) Yet, this does not invalidate the materialist argument. It is not necessary to 
prove a connection between immigration and unemployment for the materialist 
hypothesis to stand as long as it‟s possible for the voters to believe that a connection 
exists. As ERPs keep actively using this frame and promoting the understanding that the 
connection exists, it is likely that the sentiment is there. 
 
The theory expects conflicts to be more severe in regions with high unemployment 
rates. Competition and conflict of interests lead to exclusionist reactions from majority 
groups, with trends that show a stronger reaction from the losers of modernity:  manual 
workers, rather than white-collar job holders. (Coffè et al, 2007: 144)  
 
When it comes to studies that have measured the effect of unemployment on ERP 
success, the picture has been diverse. Baimbridge et al (1994, 1995) Jackman & Volpert 
(1996) found that the correlation is positive, while Knigge 1998, Lubbers & Scheepers 
(2000) and Jesuit &Mahler (2004) found the effect to be negative. Most of these studies 
covered a shorter period and it would be beneficial to check trends that last for more 
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than a decade. These studies were also taken before the last economic recession and it is 






As inflation reduces the value of one‟s income and lowers individuals purchasing 
power, the competition theory predicts a positive correlation between inflation and ERP 
success. Knigge (1998: 257) argues that when the period of quick economic growth and 
low inflation came to an end in the 1970s oil crises it reinforced the social 
marginalization that had occurred during the industrial modernization. Inflation 
functions as an amplifier of negative trends in the economy and falling status and living 
standards reinforce the threat of out-group prejudice and scapegoating. Previous studies 
have yet again produced contradicting results and a wide scale dataset covering a 
decade should help to clear these issues.   
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3. Hypotheses  
 
This chapter compares the macro-level indicators suggested by the two main theories 
that explain extreme-right parties‟ success and national-level voting data. The first looks 
at the demographic composition and percentage of immigrants among the population. 
The second looks at macroeconomic indicators  - economic growth, inflation and 
unemployment. 
 
The reasons for choosing macro level indicators are related directly to the nature of the 
theories, which study the effect of national changes such as economic decline and influx 
of immigrants on election results. But they also aim to clarify contradictory results from 
previous macro level studies and particularly in light of recent global changes such as a 
rise in immigration rates as well as an economic recession. 
 
The hypothesis are the following: 
 
H1: The higher the share of immigrants in the overall population of the region, the 
stronger the support for extreme-right wing parties in elections.  
 
H2: Higher the rates of unemployment and inflation and lower the rates of economic 
growth, the stronger the support for extreme-right wing parties in elections. 
 
The first hypothesis looks at the number of migrants as a percentage of the population 
and assumes that in countries with higher rates of migrants there is higher support for 
extreme-right wing parties. It is also expected that as the number of migrants rises over 
the study period in the country, support for extreme-right parties increases in that 
region. The regions are chosen to match the regions for which there exists data on 
immigrant population as well as election districts, which means they were not chosen by 
the lowest indicator, such as an election district for example but by the lowest common 
denominator for both data sources. This also means that the district‟s overall population 





Countries with greater economic growth and lower unemployment should have less 
extreme-right party success in elections. This research will be conducted on the regional 
level for unemployment but on a national level for economic growth and inflation, as 
the data for regional level for the last two indicators is not available. The time period of 
this research covers economic growth and decline periods in the European economy and 
it is also expected that during a period of economic growth, extreme-right support 
declines and during economic recession, it rises. Economic decline is seen as an extra 
incentive in addition to immigration rates that should further spur right-wing support.  
 
As previous research has received results in support of these hypotheses as well as 
against them, it is of interest to see if recent wide scale data can offer satisfying support 




4. Data and methods 
 
The selection of countries had two main criteria. Firstly, it was necessary that the 
Western European country being selected had an existing party that fits the ERP profile 
and it was necessary that this party had entered national parliamentary elections during 
the period of 2000 until 2011. Since countries differ in their election systems and how 
votes are transferred into mandates, the measurement unit used was percentage of the 
valid ballots cast during national election in the party‟s favor. 
 
The second criterion was a comparable means for measuring immigrant population by 
the region. Many states use different policies in order to measure immigrant population. 
There are states that only collect data on citizens and foreigners by the region but do not 
keep track of native or nonnative decent. There are also differences regarding whether 
the data concerns only the foreign born population or the second generation is also 
included. For the purposes of this study, citizenship measurements do not correspond 
with the purpose of measuring immigrant population as country specific naturalization 
will distort the results. Therefore, only countries that measure immigration and not 
citizenship could be included and it was necessary that immigration was measured in a 
similar manner. Eventually five countries emerged that fit all the criteria: the 
Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The data was gathered for all 
national elections that had at least 1 ERP running between years 2000 and 2011. 
 
Selection of election data units  
 
National elections are the primary elections both from the perspective of parties as well 
as voters. Reif and Schmitt (1979) developed a theory of first and second order 
elections. They claimed elections for national public office are the most salient elections 
and local elections as well as EU parliament elections tend to be viewed as having less 
at stake. Though they both are conducted in the same party system, still three main 
differences remain. Second order elections have a lower turnout, government parties 
tend to suffer losses, and large parties tend to suffer losses. (Marsh, 1998: 592-593) 
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The main difference between the two is that first order elections determine who is in 
power and what national policies will be pursued during the duration of the election 
cycle. The results of the second order elections will have less of an effect. The smaller 
turnout means, that second order elections represent a smaller proportion of the 
electorate, and hence, the results are more likely to differ from actual support rates for 
these political parties. Secondly, the considerations voters make, may differ when stakes 
are either higher or lower. 
 
Secondly, it indicates a change in party selection which can have different grounds. This 
has been explained through the election cycle, which proposes that government parties 
should have a smaller support rate between elections, largely due to their own campaign 
decisions. This can also be seen as protest voting and expressing discontent with 
government policies.  
 
Regardless of how these differences are explained, extreme-right party success has 
always been higher in local elections, but breaching the threshold of national elections 
indicates another level of salience for the voters. Firstly, it means that an extreme-right 
party is capable of representing issues which seem relevant in comparison to main 
stream party propositions and secondly, also the strategically minded voter, who does 
not only consider political preferences, but also the likelihood of making it into the 
parliament, is willing to give them their support. Thus, success in national elections is a 
much stronger indicator of extreme-right sentiment among the population, than any 
second order election could demonstrate, and there is a qualitative difference between 
the two. The goal of this work is to measure the influence of national election results.  
 
 
Selection of political parties  
 
Comparisons with classifications of extreme-right parties by Mudde (1999), van der 
Burg et al (2000), Golder (2003) and Minkenberg (2011) have all reached similar 
conclusions when it comes to determining which parties classify as ERPs and which do 
not and there are eventually few controversies. In the five chosen countries there is an 
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agreement among researchers which parties classify as ERPs. They all share a clear far-
right position in economic policies, stress the principles of nativism and use similar 
populist framing.  
 
In Denmark the ERP is the Danish Peoples party. In Italy four parties were marked as 
ERPs: The Northern League, Pidemont-Italian Social Movement, Venetian League and 
Lombard League. During national parliamentary elections of the given period, only 
Northern league had received votes. For Netherlands, four parties were classified but 
between 2000- and 2011 only the Geert Wilders Party and the Pim Fortuyn List 
received votes. In Sweden the ERP is the Sweden Democrats and in Norway it‟s the 





Measuring the variables mentioned in hypothesis will be as follows. Support for 
extreme-right parties will be measured through election results as a percentage of the 
entire vote, rather than as seats allocated in the parliament, as seat allocation might not 
be proportional. It is important to keep in mind that the actual vote does not directly 
correlate with support for the party as election system characteristics, such as a high 
threshold for the parliament or single member districts influence voter behavior and 
deter voters from supporting smaller parties. However, for practical considerations votes 
cast in elections give a better view of how to predict future election results and thus 
serves the purpose of this research better. The data will be viewed on the regional level 
in order to increase the level of accuracy in results. 
 
Macroeconomic indicators are taken form Eurostat data on economic growth and 
inflation rate for the year of election in question. The trend that took place during that 
period, either economic growth increases or decreases, should indicate clearly enough 
the relevant economic climate in the country. The unit of measurement is percentage of 
GDP growth. The unemployment data is regional and comes from national statistics 
databases. The number of immigrants will be taken from national statistics of each 
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country and looked at on the same unit of measurement as the election results, which in 
most cases was the province level. Data will again be converted into percentage of 
population. The definition of immigration in this case includes both the first and second 
generation. The data ads up the number of people who are either first or second 





The results were gathered for five countries and 14 different elections. The number of 
provinces for each country varied from 10 to 25, which resulted in a data pool of 227 
cases.  
 
ERP success in elections during the last decade has shown a rising trend in almost all of 
the countries in question. It also shows a high variation in results within countries but 
especially between countries. On the national level, results ranged from 2.9 percent of 
the vote in Sweden 2006 to 22.9 percent of the vote in Norway in 2009. Data on the 




Figure 1. Histogram of ERP support in elections as a percentage of the total vote and 
frequency of the result on y-axis. 
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Norway in particular stands out with a very high ERP success rate, where the average 
support rate by region in elections is the highest (mean 19.2%) of the vote. Denmark 
follows with an average of 12.8% of the vote. Netherlands has an average support rate 
of 9.9%. The lowest and similar scores are shared by Sweden and Italy. In Sweden the 
measured ERP has only taken part in two most recent elections and it stands out with 
below average results (mean: 3.9%) Italy has an average ERP vote of even lower, of just 
3.8%. The differences are also wide apart between regions. Denmark and Sweden stand 
out with a small standard deviation (slightly above 2 for both), which means that ERP 
support is consistent between regions and the party holds a fairly stable electorate across 
the country. Italy, on the other hand, has a standard deviation of 6.4 and a very strong 
regional distribution. It was the only country with regions that consistently over 
elections never voted for an ERP and got a score of 0, and regions where the score was 
consistently high. In Norway deviation was 5.5 which is also high, but ERPs did receive 
votes in all regions. The lowest results began at 10 percent of the vote and ranged up to 
29 percent. In Netherlands standard deviation was 5.9 and support ranged from 3 to 26 
percent of the vote. This information suggests that one would expect to see strong 
country effects in the overall results, which are affected by high variation between total 
scores as well as standard deviation within country results. 
 
5.1. Immigration and ERP support 
 
The first hypothesis predicted a positive correlation between immigration and ERP 
success and this correlation seems to be supported by evidence. Immigration data also 
has fairly high variations in results. The Netherlands stands out with the highest percent 
of immigrants among the overall population (16.4 percent of average in a region) and it 
also has the highest standard deviation of 6.1. Denmark is followed by 9% (5.22), 
Norway with 6,6% (3,6). Sweden and Italy both have low rates around 4 % and low 
standard deviations.  
 
Figure 2 shows a fairly wide distribution of data with deviations from the predicted 
value, which indicates that the results differ from a perfect linear distribution. The 
reason behind the variation is related to strong country effects in voting as well as 
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immigration data. The immigration data creates strong effects due to concentrations of 
immigrant population in certain areas, especially the capital of the country. The theory 
predicts that the “losers of modernization” are the driving force behind increases in 
votes for ERP. However, the distribution of immigration is more heavily centered 
around urban regions, whereas unemployment, lower levels of education and lower 
income are more likely to see a distribution closer to even results then with 
immigration. This means that a greater number of outliers and some distortion of data 
away from perfect linear correlation is to be expected in this case. Not due to lack of 
demand for ERPs but due to uneven distribution of voters with described qualities in 




Figure 2. ERP success in elections as percentage of the total vote and corresponding 
regional immigration levels as percentage of the population 
 
The graph shows that regions with immigration rates well above average do not all 
show a proportional increase in ERP support. This was to be excepted as the distribution 
of immigrant population is more uneven then the distribution of potential ERP voters.  
 
Figure 2 also shows a cluster of regions with very low ERP support, which is a 




























ERP % of votes in elections 
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Lega Nord, yet southern regions still have comparable levels of immigrants among their 
population compared to those regions which do vote for Lega Nord. As party success in 
elections does not only depend on macro level indicators measured here, but also on the 
strategic choices of the party and regional voting patterns of every country separately 
then the given distortion is also acceptable as it does not undermine the prediction that 
on average, there is a positive correlation between immigration and ERP support. This 
distortion comes less pronounced, when the linear regression analysis also includes 
country dummies as shown later on in this chapter.  
 
 
5.2. Unemployment and ERP support 
 




Figure 3. ERP support as percentage of the vote and unemployment rate in the region 
as percentage of the working age population. 
 
Unemployment contrarily to theory predictions produces a negative correlation with 
ERP support. The graph in general shows a clearer correlation and less deviation from 

































ERP support as % of the vote 
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state by state, we find the unemployment levels are equally low in all countries, 
Denmark, Norway and Netherlands average around 3 percent, Sweden is slightly higher 
with 5 percent and all these four countries have rather equal unemployment rates across 
regions with small standard deviation. Italy again is an exception where unemployment 
in some southern regions goes up to 25 percent even if the average unemployment rate 
is only 7 percent.  
 
Italy is also the main reason behind a cluster of results with 0 percent support for ERPs 
but with highest unemployment rates.  This is again an exceptional case introduced by 
Italy, where the ERP only has a presence in the Northern region of Italy, but the highest 
unemployment rates are in the southern regions.  
 
Negative correlation is also present when one looks at country by country data. The 
only country (Sweden) where there was a slight positive correlation between 
unemployment and ERP support. All four other countries and particularly Italy showed 
a fairly strong negative correlation and consistency in the results.  
 
 
5.3. Economic Growth, Inflation and ERP support 
 
The results for economic growth are only available for state level and not regional 
levels, which will influence the results by minimizing variation for the independent 
variable.  The graph it produces is expected to be clustered on the y-axis. It show 
whether in years when economic growth was higher, the ERP support on the average 
was lower as the theory predicted.  
 
The theory predicted a negative correlation and this was supported by the data shown in 
Figure 4. The graph below shows an overall result, which is influenced by national level 
indicators. In this case, it seems that country effects magnify the real correlation to an 
extent as the countries with on average higher economic growth also happened to be 





Figure 4. ERP support as percentage of the vote and economic growth as a percentage 
of GDP in the election year 
 
When this data is analyzed with countries added as dummy variables, the effect of 
economic growth continues to be negative, but the standardized coefficient falls from -




Inflation and ERP support 
 
Inflation and ERP support were predicted to have a positive correlation. This analysis, 
however, shows a slight negative correlation. Again, as country level data was used and 
not regional data, the results are expected to vary according to country effects rather 
than regional indicators. In comparison to economic growth, the results are however 
placed closer to the predicted value and smaller deviation occurs among the independent 
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Figure 5: ERP support in elections as percentage of the total vote and inflation rate in 
the year of the elections. 
 
Before drawing final conclusions on the effect of immigration, it is necessary to add all 
the data to the general regression model to check the correlation and also the 




5.4. Regression analysis 
 
Regression analysis involved ERP support as a percentage of the overall vote as the 
dependent variable and it was compared to the percentage of immigrants in the region, 
unemployment rate in the region, economic growth as percentage of the GDP and 
inflation of the local currency within the election year. The analysis also included 
dummy variables for countries in order to check for country effects. Norway remained 
as the base category other results were assessed against.  
 




















ERP support in elections 
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*** p<.001; ** p< .01; * p<.05 
 
Adjusted R square of .343 shows that the correlation with four variables can account for 
34% of the variation in ERP vote share in elections. Considering we expect party 
success to depend on more than macro level indicators, the result is satisfying for the 
purposes of this research. All the coefficients turned out to be significant after 




Increase in the share of immigrants by one percent produces and increase of 26% in the 
voter for ERP. While keeping in mind that immigration levels are bound to vary in ways 
that differ from distribution of ERP voters, this can be considered to be a fairly good 
indicator.  
 
What came as more of a surprise in this case was the clear negative relationship 
between unemployment and ERP support. The results were partly explained already by 
Italy but since the correlation was negative and stable in four of the five observed 
countries, this can‟t be explained merely by party strategies for campaigning regionally. 
In Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands we observed the same effect. While Sweden 
showed a positive relationship between unemployment and ERP vote. 
                                                          
1
 Examining residuals showed the model to have a reasonably good fit. Though there are some outliers, 




As there have been previous studies measuring the effect of unemployment in both 
directions we can firstly say the country selection matters a great deal in drawing 
reliable generalizations based on differences in the slope of the regression line. We can 
also say that although the theory‟s most basic prediction of group competition which is 
highly dependent on group size holds true in all countries with a fairly high confidence 
interval, we may have to reconsider the exact intermediating factors that influence the 
correlation.  
 
One of the possible explanations for the negative correlation with unemployment is that 
although we can predict a rise in prejudice, there is also a dimension of solving the issue 
of unemployment itself. In this case, though right wing parties would be supported 
when it came to the question of restricting immigration, they may not be perceived as 
the best party to deal with mediating the negative effects of existing unemployment due 
to their position on the far right of economic policies. They do not support redistribution 
of wealth and unless they offer specific and plausible options for solving the issue, they 
may lose votes to parties more in favor of redistributing wealth and actively managing 
the labor market.  
 
This work could not explain these effects, but it would make for a valuable analysis to 
compare ERP success with other party groups under similar circumstances in order to 
determine possible reasons for this unexpected result and thus modify the competition 
theory on the issue of unemployment.  
 
Economic growth was expected to have a negative correlation with ERP success and the 
regression analysis supported the results. Economic growth has the highest standardized 
coefficient and the lowest risk for the zero hypothesis to be true, which indicates a very 
strong marker of correlation for ERP success. This is well supported by the theory 
presented in the first chapters of the thesis and it supports the argument that scarcity of 
resources increases prejudice towards out-groups  
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However, these were country level indicators and the sample size was less flexible in 
terms of the dependent variable variation. As the effect of economic growth has also 
been measured to be weaker depending on the sample size and specific study in 
question, it would be useful for these indicators to be measured on a greater scale than 
just 5 countries.  
 
Inflation was measured to be negative with a slightly higher chance of the zero 
hypothesis to be true than other indicators even if significance on .009 is well within the 
limits of reliability. The standardized coefficient was also the lowest, although it still 
explains a function of the variation and is thus relevant for this research.  
 
We can conclude, based on this research, that competition theory‟s main starting points 
have found confirmation based on the example of these 5 countries and regional data. 
Both economic growth and the percentage of immigrants among the population are 
crucial indicators for the theory and have found support by the data.  
 
However, it is also relevant to keep in mind that ERP support varies significantly due to 
country and party specific reasons, which means that the selection of countries in this 
study is of crucial importance and conclusions drawn on this sample may not hold true 
with all ERPs across Europe. Italy was definitely a unique case in terms of ERP support 
and regional distribution, which means that the effect Italy had on this study should be 
considered when drawing wider generalizations. Also, Sweden showed an unexpected 
positive relationship between ERP support and unemployment, which should be 
considered, even if in other variable relationships Sweden was much closer to the 
overall trend.  
 
The trends detected in this study are statistically sound and fairly straightforward. 
This gives support for the claim the changes in ERP vote shares are more than protest 
votes or party success due to improved framing. These are consistent trends which 




It also clear that competition theory requires more research, particularly on the issue of 
unemployment. This would presume a comparison of ERP support with other party 
families to understand how macroeconomic indicators influence party competition over 
votes. Another important question beside party competition could be answered by an 
individual level data comparison to measure the importance on unemployment in voting 
patterns and how it affects party choice. Currently, there are two possible explanations 
for the problem, either unemployment acts differently from other scarcity variables in 
terms of increasing prejudice and instead of creating rising trends in ERP support, it 
reduces it. The competition explanation would be that it still increases prejudice but 
changes that motivation and priorities of the voter away from prejudice and closer to 
competing values and sentiments. They both hold relevant implications for competition 






Extreme-right parties have shown increasing trends over the past three decades that few 
other party groups can match. There have been various attempts to explain this 
phenomenon, yet the exact reasons behind the party success have not yet fully received 
satisfying answers, as conducted research has often reached contradicting results. This 
thesis aims to contribute to the research firstly by analyzing trends that took place over a 
longer period of time. Secondly, by not only  drawing conclusions based on cross-
national data, but by following trends also state by state in order to detect anomalies  
that might interfere with the final results. The ladder is particularly important with this 
research as measured variables all vary considerably and a crude correlation may be 
misleading.  
 
The study first begins by explaining the trends that have taken place among ERPs and 
electoral behavior. We have found that changes have been relevant on both fronts. On 
the party level, majority of ERPs have given up their most extreme standpoints on 
racism and anti-democratic tendencies, which has considerably widened their appeal. At 
the same time, we have also seen a structural change in the society that coincided with 
ERP comeback to the Western European electoral market. The structural change has 
manifested itself through volatile economic growth, rising unemployment and 
increasing rates of immigration.  
 
The starting point of the thesis was competition theory. The theory predicts that when 
the dominant ethnic/racial group in the society experiences increased competition over 
scarce resources with minority groups, it increases prejudice towards out-groups. The 
prejudice takes the form of ERP support during elections in ERP. Based on this theory, 
two hypotheses were formed. First predicts a positive relationship between rise in 
immigrant population and ERP support. The second predicts that macroeconomic 
indicators such as unemployment, economic growth and inflation should have 
significant effect on ERP support.  
 
 49 
The results show that all the tested correlations were significant and explained a fair 
share of the variation in ERP success. Immigration and ERP support have a positive 
correlation as predicted by the theory. During period of high economic growth ERP as 
more likely to receive lower support then with lower results for GDP growth. This was 
also predicted by the theory and hence, two main pillars of the competition theory found 
support. However unemployment rates and inflation did not behave as the theory 
predicted. Inflation showed a very small negative correlation but with unemployment, 
fours countries out of five demonstrated a fairly strong negative correlation, whereas 
only Sweden confirmed the theory. 
 
The implications to be drawn from this research are as follow. Immigration, as the basis 
of increased competition between in-groups and out-groups, did produce consistent and 
high correlation with ERP success, which shows that immigration, is a relevant factor in 
this field. Also, as immigration levels will probably continue to grow, we can expect to 
a continued ERP success. Relevance of economic growth was also supported by the 
theory over all, the most basic predictions of the competition theory hold.  
 
The anomalies that took the form of unexpected results for unemployment and inflation, 
suggest that competition theory requires further investigation in order to determine what 
the reasons are for falling ERP support. This can mean that either these variables 
decrease prejudice towards out-groups, or high unemployment levels influence voter 
behavior in favor of competing parties without a change in prejudice. Both of these are 
relevant directions to go to. There have been studies already conducted that analyze 
factors increasing or decreasing prejudice on the individual level, but there is still a 
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Makrotasandi võrdlused ja paremäärmuslike erakondade edu 
valmistel Lääne-Euroopas - Kokkuvõte 
 
Paremäärmuslikud erakonnad on olnud kõige kiiremini kasvava toetusega erakonna 
grupp viimase kolme kümnendi jooksul Lääne-Euroopas.  1980ndate alguses said 
paremäärmuslikud erakonnad keskmiselt ühe protsendi häältest riiklikel parlamendi 
valimistel. 2000. aastaks oli see näitaja kasvanud 5% ning on jätkanud kasvu ka sealt 
edasi. Muutus on olnud märgatav ühtemoodi kogu Lääne-Euroopas ning see on 
toimunud nii olemasolevate erakondade toetuse suurenemises kui ka uute erakondade 
tekkena riikides, kus varem parmäärmuslike erakondi ei toetatud.  
 
Sellisel skaalal toimuvad muutused näitavad, et tegu on kõigi eeluduste kohaselt 
rohkemaga kui protesti häältega, ning me ei saa ka pidada paremäärmuslikke erakondi 
ühevaldkonna erakonnaks, millele on piiratud valijaskond ning reeglina lühike eluiga. 
Muutused on toimunu nii nõudluses kui pakkumises. Erakondade poole pealt on 
toimunud nihe vähem äärmuslike hoiakute suunas, kus suurem osa neist on loobunud 
näiteks bioloogilise rassismi toetamisest ning ka demokraatlike väärtustega vastuollu 
minek on olnud järjest vähem tõenäoline.  See on võimaldanud paremäärmuslikel 
erakondadel konkureerida laiemale valijaskonnale ning konkureerida peavoolu 
erakondadega. Nõudluse poolele on muutunud valijate käitumine, kes järjest rohkem 
peavad oluliseks teemasid nagu immigratsiooni ja rahvus ning kultuuriline ühtsus, ning 
järjest suurem osakaal valijaid on nõus äärmuslikke erakondi toetama. Lisaks sellele on 
toimunud olulised struktuursed muutused ühiskonnas, mille algus langeb kokku 
parmäärmuslike erakondade valimisedu tõusu perioodiga. Viimaste kümnendite jooksul 
on majanduskasv aeglustunud ning toonud kaasa suurema ebastabiilsuse, tööpuudus on 
tõusnud, vähendades inimeste majanduslikku kindlustatust ning on suurenenud 
immigrantide osakaal ühiskonnas. Nii nõudluse kui pakkumise poole muutused vajavad 
seletust, ning see eeldab konkreetsete erakondade ja valimiste vaatlemist.  
 
Katsed ootamatut ja järsku tõusu paremäärmuslike erakondade edus on püütud 
korduvalt seletada , kuid siiani pole saavutatud täielikult rahuldavaid tulemusi, sest 
erinevate uurimiste vahel on  mitmeid vastuolusid. Magistritöö püüab anda oma panuse 
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kõige pealt vaadates laiemaid ja püsivamaid muutusi üle kümneaastase perioodi. 
Teiseks, võetakse lisaks üldistele korrelatsioonidele arvesse riiklikud kõikumised, et 
välistada eksitavaid tulemusi, mis on olnud põhjustatud riikide eripäradest.  
 
Töö aluseks on konkurentsi teooria, mis eeldab, et kui ühiskonnas domineeriv etniline 
või rassiline grupp satub piiratud ressursside tõttu tugevamaste võistlusesse piiratud 
ressursside pärast, siis peaks suurenema eelarvamusliku hoiakud vähemusgruppide 
suunas. Eelarvamusliku hoiakud omakorda avalduvad valimistel paremäärmuslike 
erakondade poolt hääletamises. Selle põhjal loodi kaks hüpoteesi. Esimene  ennustab 
positiivset korrelatsiooni immigrantide osakaalu ja parmäärmuslike erakondade edu 
vahel regioonis. Teine ennustab makromajanduslike näitajate – tööpuuduse, 
majanduskasvu ja inflatsiooni mõju paremäärmuslike erakondade edule.  
 
Andmestik koguti viie riigi parlamendi valimistelt perioodil 2000-2011. Andmeid 
võrreldaks regioonide tasandil koos immigrantide osakaaluga koguelanikkonnast ning 
töötuse osakaaluga regioonis. Andmete võrreldavus tekitas mõningaid probleeme, seda 
just eriti immigratsiooni kohta andmete kohapealt, ning see seadis piirangud, mis viis 
viie riigi valimiseni: Holland, Itaalia, Taani, Rootsi ja Norra. Valimiste andmed koguti 
kõigi valimiste kohta sel perioodil, kus astus üles vähemalt üks paremäärmuslik 
erakond. Immigratsiooni all mõeldakse nii esimese kui teise põlvkonna esindajaid ning 
nende osakaalu regiooni kogu elanikkonna hulgas. Tööpuuduse andmed on sammuti 
regionaalsed, kui andmed majanduskasvu ning inflatsiooni kohta on kogutud riiklikul 
tasemel. 
 
Tulemused saadi läbi regressioonanalüüsi, mis  hõlmas üht sõltuvat muutujat 
(paremäärmuslike erakonda protsent valimistel saadud häältest) ning nelja sõltumatut 
muutujat, milleks oli tööpuudus, majanduskasv, inflatsioon ja immigratsioon. Need neli 
näitajat seletavad kokkuvõttes ära suhteliselt kõrge osa variatsioonist parmäärmuslike 
erakondade edus. Hüpotees immigratsiooni ja paremäärmuslike erakondade edu kohta 
leidis kinnitust. Sammuti leidis kinnitust, et majanduskasvu ja parmäärmuslike 
erakondade vahel on negatiivne korrelatsioon. Samas tööpuuduse ja paremäärmuslike 
erakondade edu vahel oodati, positiivset seost, kuid see osutus negatiivseks. Viiest 
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riigist neljas oli olemas tugev negatiivne korrelatsiooni ning Rootsi oli ainus riik, mis 
käitus ootuspäraselt. Ka inflatsiooni puhul leidis kinnitust oodatust vastupidine 
korrelatsioon, kuigi viimase korrelatsiooni näitajad oli teistest madalamad, ning seega 
oli efekt väiksem.  
 
Selle põhjal on võimalik teha kask suuremat järeldust. Esiteks, immigratsioon , kui 
konkurentsiteooria olulisim alustala leidis kinnitust. Tegemist oli selge ja olulise 
korrelatsiooniga, mis oli sarnane kõigi riikides. Majanduskasvu ja parmäärmuslike 
erakondade edu vahel oli negatiivne korrelatsioon, ning arvestades, et hetkel on 
Euroopa veel majanduslangusega ja selle tagajärgedega tegelemas, ning ka 
immigrantide osakaal pigem kasvan kui kahaneb, siis võib oodata, et paremäärmuslike 
erakondade edu pigem jätkub  
 
Anomaaliad teoorias, mis esinesid tööpuuduse ja inflatsiooni näol tuleb veel analüüsida 
põhjalikult. Seda on võimalik teha kahel suunal. Esiteks analüüsides, kas 
eelarvamuslikes hoiakutes toimuvad muutused tööpuuduse ja inflatsiooni puhul. Teiseks 
vaadates, millistele erakondadele paremäärmuslikud erakonnad kõrge tööpuuduse ja 
inflatsiooni tingimustes kaotavad. Eelarvamuslike hoiakute analüüsi on juba läbiviidud, 
kuigi mitte nende muutujate mõõtmisega. Paremäärmuslike erakondade võimet 
konkureerida peavoolu erakondadega on aga vähe veel siiani vaadatud, ning see oleks 
üks oluline valdkond, mida edasi uurida.  
